The Federal Power Commission, Job Bias, and NAACP v. FPC by Kennedy, John N.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2015
The Federal Power Commission, Job Bias, and
NAACP v. FPC
John N. Kennedy
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kennedy, John N. (1977) "The Federal Power Commission, Job Bias, and NAACP v. FPC," Akron Law Review: Vol.
10 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss3/8
THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, JOB BIAS, AND
NAACP v. FPC
JOHN N. KENNEDY*
For good thoughts, though God accept them, yet towards men are
little better than good dreams, except they be put in act; and that
cannot be done without power and place, as the vantage and
commanding ground.
Sir Francis Bacont
F REE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM has long been used to describe the structure
of the American economy. Yet in a critical sense this characterization is a
misnomer, because for many Americans the system has always been any-
thing but free. Indeed, racial and sex discrimination are commonplace even
today among the employment practices of a frightening number of employers.
Gradually, however, the justice of equal employment opportunity is at last
beginning to be recognized, even if it is not yet being universally administered,
and many Americans are fast becoming genuinely committed to its realiza-
tion. Because of this, a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court
takes on special significance.
In NAACP v. FPC1 the Court gamely grappled with a previously un-
addressed issue in the area of equal employment opportunity. The Court
attempted for the first time to resolve the question of whether a federal
regulatory agency other than the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission,2 in this case the Federal Power Commission, possesses the requisite
jurisdiction to regulate employment discrimination by its regulatees. The
Court determined that the FPC does possess such jurisdiction, but only to
a very limited, circumscribed degree. Unfortunately, in light of the per-
vasiveness of job bias by FPC-regulated natural gas and electric power
companies and the FPC's unique ability and untapped authority to deal with
* B.A., Vanderbilt University; Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Virginia School of Law.
t-F. BACON, OF GREAT PLACE, in THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS CIVIL AND MORAL OF FRANCIS
BACON 31 (F. Howe ed. 1908).
1 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970), as
amended, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314, 5316,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-l to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V,
1975), charges the EEOC with the responsibility of regulating employment discrimination by
all employers that have fifteen or more employees and all labor organizations that operate a
hiring hall or have fifteen or more members. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2, 2000e-5 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Natural gas and electric power companies with fifteen or more
employees are therefore within the regulatory jurisdiction of the EEOC.
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such discrimination, the Court's holding is unnecessarily narrow, rendering
its decision less than satisfactory.
This article will carefully examine the holding and reasoning of NAACP
v. FPC in light of the serious absence of equal employment opportunity in
the natural gas and electric power industries. It will consider how and why
comprehensive FPC regulation of job bias would likely be effective both in
furthering the national goal of equal employment opportunity and in effect-
uating the purposes for which the FPC was created. Finally, it will demon-
strate that the Supreme Court's failure to recognize a statutory requirement
that the FPC affirmatively prescribe and extensively regulate the employ-
ment practices of its regulatees is unwarranted.
I. THE PROBLEM
Employment in the natural gas and electric power industries is char-
acterized by relatively high pay, job stability, a low level of training required
for initial hire in most nonprofessional jobs, on-the-job training, and a
significant amount of promotion from within. Thus, it would seem that
employment and advancement of minority and female employees would be
considerable. Such is not the case.'
A congressional committee has observed that "[d]iscriminatory em-
ployment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
are more prevalent in the utilities industry than in most other major indus-
tries."4 The EEOC has found, for example, that black employment by natu-
ral gas and electric power companies is the lowest (6.1 percent compared
to the 10.1 percent average for all major industries) among the twenty-three
major industries reporting employment of 500,000 employees or more.5
Statistics demonstrate that discrimination against Spanish-surnamed Ameri-
3 U .S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-
1974, at 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974]. See
Brown, Poor Equal Employment Record of Electric Power Industry, in 115 CONG. REC.
13977 (1969).
4 CIVIL RIGHTS OVERSIGHT SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES].
5 CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 3, at 129-32; Hearings Before the
Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Responsibilities of
the Federal Power Commission in the Area of Civil Rights, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, 121, 122(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Natural gas and electric power companies employ
almost 70 percent of their black employees in less desirable low-paying service and laborer
positions. Less than four percent of the industries' white collar workers are black and 80
percent of these are office and clerical workers. Less than one percent of the industries' man-
agerial and professional personnel are black. One-half of the natural gas and electric power
companies filing EEO-1 reports with the EEOC in 1970 reported no black employees. Id. For
a discussion of trends in black employment by public utilities, see B. ANDERSON, NEGRO
EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC UTILITIES chs. III-V (1970).
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cans and women is equally extensive.6 It is not surprising, then, that former
EEOC Chairman William H. Brown, III has testified:
Employment discrimination is not new to us. The people who serve
this Commission have spent most of their adult lives working on prob-
lems of human rights. We deal with discrimination every day.
Yet we are shocked. We are astounded in the face of testimony
which indicates actual systems of repression by gas and electric utility
companies. Not only are women and minority individuals now working
in the lowest job classifications, it appears that they are locked into
these undesirable jobs for the rest of their working lives.7
Numerous documents, statutes, and executive orders attest to the fact
that in theory and in principle equal employment opportunity is supposed to
be the law of the land.8 Moreover, the Court on numerous occasions has
parroted the oft-spoken rhetoric that the elimination of employment dis-
crimination is a national policy of the highest order.9 Commendable as this
is, it is against the harsh backdrop of reality, as described by former EEOC
Chairman Brown, that NAACP v. FPC must be considered.
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF NAACP v. FPC
Plaintiffs in NAACP v. FPC were the NAACP and twelve other civil
rights organizations representing the interests of black, Spanish-surnamed,
6 Spanish-surnamed Americans represent 3.6 percent of the national labor force, but hold only
1.6 percent of the jobs in the natural gas and electric power industries. They hold only 1.4
percent of the white collar positions, and 67 percent of these positions are office and clerical
jobs. Less than one percent of the industries' managerial and professional personnel are
Spanish-surnamed Americans. While women constitute 38 percent of the national labor force,
they hold only 14.8 percent of the jobs in the natural gas and electric power industries. These
industries relegate nine out of 10 of their female employees to office and clerical positions.
Female employment in upper level white collar jobs is also minimal (1.3 percent of the
managerial personnel, 2.5 percent of the professional personnel, and 1.5 percent of the
technicians). CivsL RsIHTs ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 3, at 129-32; Hearings,
supra note 5, at 1, 3, 121, 122.
7 Hearings, supra note 5, at 153.
8 The Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment express the ideal of equal employment opportunity. The Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975); The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. §9 1981, 1982 (1970); The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e to 2000e-17 (1973), as amended, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. § 5108, 5314, 5316, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V, 1975); Exec.
Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 10294 (1970);
Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3
C.F.R. 207 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 10297 (1970); equal employment op-
portunity legislation of at least forty states, LAB. REL. REP. FEP MANUAL 451:21-26 (1975)
and the laws of numerous cities and muncipalities also reflect the national commitment that
supposedly exists against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
9 See, e.g., 425 U.S. at 665; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
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native, and female Americans. The NAACP alleged widespread employment
discrimination against minorities and women by natural gas and electric
power companies and petitioned the FPC to adopt a rule prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
the employment practices of its regulatees. The NAACP attached a proposed
rule to its petition.1" The FPC issued a declaratory order refusing to initiate
the requested rulemaking proceedings on the ground that the Commission
allegedly has no jurisdiction to regulate the employment practices of its
regulatees." After the FPC denied a petition for rehearing, 2 the NAACP
sought direct review of the FPC order in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit." Both the NAACP and the FPC then
petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the controversy and the Court granted
certiorari.
III. THE HOLDING OF NAACP v. FPC
The NAACP asserted both a statutory and a constitutional basis for
FPC jurisdiction to regulate employment discrimination."4 The NAACP's
statutory argument was two-pronged. First, the NAACP argued that the
FPC must involve itself in such regulation because Congress through the
Commission's enabling acts directed the FPC to advance the "public in-
terest."" Second, the NAACP argued that the Commission must regulate
job bias because Congress through these acts also directed the FPC to ensure
"just and reasonable" rates for the consumer in the transmission and sale of
electric energy and natural gas.' Refusal by the Commission to regulate job
bias, argued the NAACP, would thus allow the unnecessary and illegitimate
costs of employment discrimination to continue to be passed along to the
consumer.
10 The rule would have empowered the FPC "to prescribe personnel practices in detail and
to receive complaints, adjudicate them and punish directly infractions of those practices." It
also would have required regulatees to adopt affirmative action programs. NAACP v. FPC,
520 F.2d 432, 433, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a/t'd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976). For the provisions of
the proposed rule see the appendix to the opinion of the D.C. Circuit, id. at 448.
"1 NAACP, No. R-447 (FPC July 11, 1972).
12 NAACP, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, No. R-477 (FPC Aug. 21, 1972).
13 NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
14 The NAACP argued on the basis of the "state action doctrine" that the FPC has a con-
stitutional duty under the fifth amendment to regulate its regulatees' job bias. The Court
found it unnecessary to address this issue because the Court was able to ground its holding
on language in the Commission's enabling acts. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 665 n.2 (1976).
15 This statutory command appears throughout the Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §
791-823 (1970), the Federal Power Act, id. §§ 824-825, and the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 717 et seq. (1970). See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a), 717f(a), 717f(b), 717f(c), 717f(e), 717n
(1970); 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(a), 797(e), 797(g), 800(a), 803(i), 806, 815 (1970); id. 9H
824(a), 824(b), 824(c), 824(e), 824a(a); 824a(b), 824a(c), 824a(e), 824b(a), 824b(b),
824c(a) (1970).
'
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c(a), 717d(a) (1970); 16 U.S.C. §H 813 (1970); id. § 824d(a)
(1970).
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The Court rejected the first prong of the statutory argument. "This
Court's cases," stated Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,1" "have con-
sistently held that the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute
is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare.""8 Then, looking
to the purposes for which Congress passed the FPC's enabling acts, the Court
held:
The use of the words "public interest" in the Gas and Power Acts is
not a directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination,
but rather is a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful
supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just and reasonable rates. 9
The Court found it instructive to analogize to federal labor law:
No less than in the federal legislation defining the national interest
in ending employment discrimination, Congress in its earlier labor
17 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and White joined Justice
Stewart in the majority opinion. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion and Chief
Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Marshall took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
18 425 U.S. at 669.
19 Id. at 670. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974),
quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934) ("In several of the decisions of this
court wherein the expressions 'affected with a public interest,' and 'clothed with a public use,'
have been brought forward as the criteria . . ., it has been admitted that they are not suscep-
tible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test . . ."); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399
U.S. 392, 432 (1970) (Under the Bankruptcy Act "'public interest' . . .does not refer
generally to matters of public concern apart from the public interest in the maintenance of
an adequate rail transportation system . . . ."); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321
U.S. 67, 81-82 (1944) (ICC's "guide to 'the public interest'" is the explicit congressional
objectives expressed in the agency's enabling act); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 216, 219 (1943) (FCC not empowered by "public interest" criterion
to act upon "generalities unrelated to the living problems of radio communication."); Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (meaning
of public interest "to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of radio transmission and
reception, [and] by the scope, character, and quality of services ...."); New York Cent. Sec.
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) ("[Ihe term 'public interest' . . . is not
a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to" the purposes of the Inter-
state Commerce Act); O-J Transport Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1976);
City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1971), afld sub nom., Gulf States
Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973) ("[Though its public interest language is broad its
meaning in context warrants a relatively restricted meaning."); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("Especially with First Amendment issues lurking in the near
background, the 'public interest' is too vague a criterion for administrative action unless it
is narrowed by definable standards."); City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 635 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968) ("A regulatory agency may, should, and in
some instances must, give consideration to objectives expressed by Congress in other legisla-
tion, assuming they can be related to the objectives of the statute administered by the agency.");
Alabama Elec. Coop. Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 968 (1966) ("Words like 'public interest' . . ., though of wide generality, take their
meaning and definition from the substantive provisions and purposes of the [Public Utility
Holding Company] Act."). But see Local 880, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. FCC, 436 F.2d
248 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9962-64 (1968).
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legislation unmistakably defined the national interest in free collective
bargaining. Yet it could hardly be supposed that in directing the Fed-
eral Power Commission to be guided by the "public interest," Congress
thereby instructed it to take original jurisdiction over the processing of
charges of unfair labor practices on the part of its regulatees.20
The Court accepted the fundamental premise of the NAACP's "just
and reasonable" rates argument, however. On this point the Court agreed with
the "basic conclusion" of the D.C. Circuit:
The Commission's task in protecting the consumer against ex-
ploitation can be alternatively described as the task of seeing that no
unnecessary or illegitimate costs are passed along to that consumer.
Costs incurred by reason of a regulatee's choosing to practice racial
discrimination are within the reach of that responsibility. 2
The Court thus held that Congress' directive to the FPC to ensure just and
reasonable rates gives rise to a type of Commission jurisdiction to regulate
job bias." This jurisdiction, however, is much more limited in scope than
that for which the NAACP argued. It extends only to the prevention of
Commission regulatees "from charging rates based on illegal, duplicative, or
unnecessary labor costs" incurred as a result of employment discrimination:
For example, when a company complies with a backpay award result-
ing from a finding of employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,... it pays twice for work that was
performed only once. The amount of the backpay award, therefore, can
and should be disallowed as an unnecessary cost in a ratemaking
proceeding. 5
20 425 U.S. at 671.
21 Id. at 666-67, quoting NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The FPC
disallows unreasonable costs through its uniform accounting requirements. See General In-
structions, 2E of 18 C.F.R. Parts 101, 104, 201, and 204 (1976). See also Account 426.3
of 18 C.F.R. Parts 101, 104, 201, and 204 (1975), which states that regulatees must deduct
from income penalties or fines for violations of any regulatory statutes or other laws.2 2 See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968) ("Accordingly, there
can be no constitutional objection if the Commission, in its calculation of rates, takes fully
into account the various interests which Congress has required it to reconcile."); FPC v.
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 154 (1962); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) ("The purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to
underwrite just and reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas .... and to afford
consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and
charges. . . ."); Pennsylvania Water and Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952) ("A
major purpose of the whole [Federal Power] Act is to protect power consumers against
excessive prices."); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1936) ("[Rlegulation
cannot be frustrated by a requirement that the rate be made to compensate extravagant or
unnecessary costs . . . ."); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) (Com-
mission's task under the Natural Gas Act is to "protect consumers against exploitation at
the hands of natural gas companies . . . ."); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 411 (10th
Cir. 1970); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949); S. REP.
No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1938).
23 425 U.S. at 668.
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This article will term such narrow court-sanctioned regulation "limited
flow-through regulation."2 It is important to distinguish limited flow-through
regulation from "regulation per se"--the term used by the D.C. Circuit for
the more expansive type of supervision supported by the NAACP's pro-
posed rule. 5 According to the Court, regulation per se has no statutory basis,
and for this reason it not only is not required but probably is prohibited
as well.26
IV. THE MERITS OF FPC REGULATION
The scope of regulation notwithstanding, FPC involvement in the equal
employment opportunity enforcement effort has never been more appropriate.
As previously emphasized, employment discrimination among public utilities is
alarmingly pervasive. Moreover, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission is floundering. The EEOC labors under a tremendous backlog
of complaints, presently over the 100,000 mark,2" which is increasing so
rapidly that eventually it could take up to five years to process a charge of
discrimination.2" Furthermore, between March 1972, when the Commission
obtained the authority to bring civil suits to enforce Title VII, and March
1975, the EEOC filed only 290 civil actions.29
The EEOC's poor record is attributable in large part to problems from
within. The Commission lacks internal coordination and cohesiveness." Intra-
24 Limited flow-through regulation, as defined by the Court, would involve the consideration
and disallowance of the costs of job bias in the course of Commission regulatory proceedings.
Ratemaking proceedings would appear to be the most likely vehicle for such regulation, but
licensing proceedings, certificate of public convenience and necessity hearings, and any other
FPC authorization proceedings presumably would be appropriate as well.
25 See 520 F.2d at 439; note 10 and accompanying text supra.
26 See 425 U.S. at 666-67.
27 V U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-
1974, at 529 (1975) [hereinafter cited as V CIrIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974].
Congressional sources estimate that by the end of fiscal year 1976 the backlog will be between
120,000 and 150,000 complaints. House Panel May Conduct EEOC Probe, The Washington
Post, April 22, 1976 at Al, col. 6, A18, col. 1.
28 Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Administration
or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 46, 58 (1973); Chapman, An Agency
in Shambles, The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1977, at Al, col. 5, A10, col. 1. Recently appointed
EEOC Commissioner Daniel E. Leach estimates that charges are coming into the EEOC
at the rate of 6,000 to 7,000 per month. Inadequacy Is Charged in Eflorts By Government
to End Job Bias, The Morning Advocate, Aug. 3, 1976, at 18A, col. 1.
219 V CIvL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 27, at 645. As of March 1974,
the average EEOC attorney was able to accomodate only one-fifth of his or her prescribed
caseload. Id. at 541, 645. The EEOC is seriously understaffed, and the low number of suits
filed, as well as the delay that has occurred in those suits that the Commission has filed, is
due in part to the failure of the EEOC Office of General Counsel to fill expeditiously vacant
staff positions. Id. at 541, 643. The Commission has, however, been impeded by a serious
lack of funds. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIviL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT-
A REASSESSMENT 79 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REASSESSMENT]. See note 33 infra.
30 See V CIvL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 27, at 643-46; Blumrosen,
supra note 28, at 48-49.
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agency communication of policy is inadequate and the responsibility and
accountability of each agency office remains undefined." A high attrition rate
among the Commission's managerial personnel, which includes frequent
turnover of both the EEOC chairmanship and membership on the five-person
Commission, at least partially explains this indirection." One authority, a
former EEOC consultant, has warned that the Commission is succumbing to
"creeping bureaucratization," which, unless remedied, will eventually lead to
near complete paralysis.3 3
The administratively bankrupt EEOC cannot alone meet the challenge
of eliminating employment discrimination. Of course, under Title VII a
victim of employment discrimination can file a private suit against an alleged
employment discriminator if the EEOC does not act within 180 days." But
private enforcement of equal employment opportunity is not a complete
answer either, as evidenced by the amount of employment discrimination
that still exists, over twelve years after Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in the natural gas and electric power industries. One viable
alternative is FPC regulation. That a regulatory agency other than the EEOC
can have a positive impact in the enforcement of equal employment oppor-
tunity was demonstrated by the January 1973 settlement between the EEOC
and American Telephone and Telegraph Company, a past employment
discriminator.3 5 The timely influence of the FCC, which regulates AT&T,
was instrumental in achieving this settlement. 6
The FPC potentially could be just as effective. Considering the large
number of natural gas and electric power companies that the Commission
regulates, FPC influence would be substantial. The Commission has estab-
S1 V CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 27, at 501-03, 643; REASSESS-
MENT, supra note 29, at 82.
32 Blumrosen, supra note 28, at 48. See Chapman, supra note 28; House Panel May Conduct
EEOC Probe, supra note 27.
33 Blumrosen, supra note 28, at 49. In addition to its many other problems, the Commission
recently was charged with fiscal irresponsibility. The Equal Opportunities Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Education and Labor may launch a major congressional investiga-
tion into charges that the EEOC spent almost $1 million over its fiscal year 1974 budget and
that its fiscal records for 1974 are "chaotic". The subcommittee may also investigate charges
that EEOC employees in two district offices mismanaged funds. House Panel May Conduct
EEOC Probe, supra note 27.
.4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
S3 The agreement called for an estimated $15 million in backpay settlements by AT&T and
an estimated $23 million to be spent by the corporation in the implementation of a promo-
tion pay plan. This settlement affected an estimated one thousand pending charges with the
EEOC against AT&T. Note, Regulatory Agencies and Equal Employment Opportunity-
Implications of the AT&T Settlement, 6 CONN. L. REV. 86, 94 n.37, 95 n.40 (1973).
36 Id. But see Daly, The FCC's Role in Providing Equal Employment Opportunity for
Minority Groups, 53 B.U. L. REv. 657 (1973), in which the author criticizes the FCC for
its inadequate attempts to regulate employment discrimination among its regulatees.
37The FPC's jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act extends to approximately 6,200 natural
gas producers, of which 82 are considered large, each selling more than 10 billion cubic feet
[Vol. 10:3
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lished an intimate working relationship with its regulatees38 Such a relationship
itself would facilitate greater as well as easier compliance with the law of
equal employment opportunity. It also makes the Commission eminently
qualified to know precisely when discrimination is occurring." Further, the
FPC's control over its regulatees' sustenance-licenses, certificates of public
convenience and necessity, and rates (including rate of return on investment)
-would be a more powerful influence than any EEOC or judicial sanction
in encouraging the abandonment of discriminatory employment practices."0
Of course, Commission regulation would not provide private remedies such
as backpay awards, for those individuals discriminated against. But these
persons could still file civil actions under Title VII and perhaps use an FPC
finding of discrimination as res judicata for a speedy recovery. 1 Private
remedy or not, however, the long term effect of sincere and committed FPC
involvement would surely be less employment discrimination.
per year. The FPC has certificate and rate jurisdiction over 123 interstate natural gas pipe-
lines. The Commission's rate jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act extends to approxi-
mately 200 public utilities selling electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. Brief
for Petitioner FPC at 29, 30, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
38 The Commission supervises practically every activity of its regulatees. The Commission
controls the rates that natural gas and electric power companies may charge and the terms
and conditions under which they must provide services. 15 U.S.C. § 717c, 717d, (1970); 16
U.S.C. §H 813, 824d, 824e (1970). It regulates their systems of accounting and recordkeeping.
15 U.S.C. § 717g (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1970). The Commission can even order these
companies to extend natural gas or electric power service to new areas. 15 U.S.C. § 717f
(1970); 16 U.S.C. H9 824a, 824f (1970). Further, the Commission controls international
imports and exports of natural gas and electric energy. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1970); 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a(e) (1970). The planning, construction, and major alteration of these regulatees'
facilities is also subject to FPC scrutiny. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 800(a),
803(a), 803(b), 803(e), 804 (1970). With respect to electric power companies only, the
Commission supervises the leasing of major facilities, mergers, and any issuance of securities
or assumption of liability. 16 U.S.C. §H 824b, 824c (1970). It also reserves the right to
assume control of electric power companies upon the expiration of their licenses or in a
national emergency. 16 U.S.C. § 807, 808, 809, 824(d) (1970). With respect to natural
gas companies only, the FPC dictates the terms under which these companies can abandon
facilities or discontinue services. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1970).
39But see J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 12-18 (1938), which discusses the mean-
ing of a "captured agency." A "captured agency" is an agency that is under the influence of
its regulatees to the point that it favors only their position. See Nader Unit Asks End of ICC,
Calls It "Captive" of Industry, The Washington Post, March 17, 1970, Al, col. 5.
40 Note, supra note 35, at 114-23; Comment, Administrative Agencies, The Public Interest,
and National Policy: Is A Marriage Possible?, 59 GEO. L.J. 420, 431, 433-34 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as The Public Interest and National Policy]. See also Agencies Hit As Ineffective
Against Bias, The Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1975, at A2, col. 1. In this article Chairman
Arthur S. Fleming of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights suggests that the Office of Man-
agement and Budget would be a more effective enforcement agency than the Justice Depart-
ment in the regulation of racial and sex discrimination in federally funded programs. Fleming
suggests that as a sanction the OMB could cut the budgets of agencies that fail to enforce
anti-bias regulations, an enforcement mechanism that is not available to the Justice Depart-
ment. Similarly, it has been suggested that the FCC should be funded only upon a showing
that it has complied with national policy. Comment, National Policy and the "Public Interest"
-A Marriage of Necessity in the Communications Act of 1934, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 386
(1966).
41 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT H9 18.01-.10 (3d ed. 1972).
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There are other advantages of FPC regulation. 2 It may be less expen-
sive and faster than alternative enforcement mechanisms. The Commission
could regulate through rules and administrative hearings, 3 while the EEOC
and private plaintiffs must seek compliance through costly and time-consum-
ing civil litigation." Commission proscription of job bias is also desirable
because whenever the FPC lacked the expertise to deal with a particular in-
stance of employment discrimination, the Commission could request the
EEOC to intervene. 5 As the AT&T settlement indicates, such intervention
likely would lessen rather than increase the present EEOC backlog."8
Two final considerations argue for FPC regulation. If the Commission
42Two of the most important advantages of Commission regulation of job bias-consumer
protection against unjust and unreasonable rates and against discrimination in the provision
of services-will be discussed in later sections.
43 The FPC has authority for rulemaking and adjudication under Section 16 of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717o (1970), and Section 309 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §825h
(1970). Generally, an agency with power to make rules and adjudicate announces policy in
any of at least seven ways-through legislative rules, interpretive rules, adjudicative opinions
or orders, orders without opinions, advisory opinions, press releases, and other informal
statements. Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 823,
830 (1975). Interpretive rules are nonbinding, advisory interpretations by an agency of
its enabling act. Legislative rules are rules, other than interpretive rules, that implement
the agency's enabling act and have the binding force of a statute. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT § 5.03 (3d ed. 1972). As used in this discussion, "rule" means "legislative rule."
Agencies usually adopt legislative rules through informal or "notice and comment" rulemaking,
the procedure for which is set forth in Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). When an agency's statute requires that rules be promulgated "on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," which the FPC statutes do not require,
Sections 556 and 557 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970), apply. This is called
formal rulemaking.
Rulemaking would be fairer both to FPC regulatees and the victims of discrimination, and it
likely would result in a more effective program for eliminating job bias as well. It would
provide both groups with notice and the opportunity to contribute their views, knowledge,
and expertise in the delicate and difficult formulation of a practical, workable policy and
procedure for eradicating job bias. It would not, however, be unduly burdensome. Robinson,
The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rule Making and Adjudication
and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 514-16 (1970). See, Bonfield,
Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511, 512 (1969).
See generally Clagett, Informal Action - Adjudication - Rule Making: Some Recent Develop-
ments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 67 (1971). For discussions of this
and other advantages (as well as disadvantages) of rulemaking and some insightful suggestions,
see Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach - Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General
Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REv. 1276 (1972); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rule Making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
485 (1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965).
4 4 See U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970, Supp. V, 1975).
45 In Note, EEOC Regulatory Intervention: An Undeveloped Means of Enforcing Title VII,
62 GEo. L.J. 1753 (1974), the author argues that the EEOC's investigative resources and
legal expertise in the area of employment discrimination, when coupled with the expansive
regulatory control that most administrative agencies exercise over their regulatees, would
lead to considerable success in the elimination and prohibition of job bias by regulatees.
48 See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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were even moderately successful in combatting employment discrimination,
perhaps those regulatory agencies that have considered the promulgation of
an equal employment opportunity rule, and even those that have not, would
actively join in the effort to end job bias." Additionally, FPC regulation is
probably the only practical means by which consumers could vindicate their
contempt for the invidious discrimination of an FPC regulatee. It is difficult
for consumers to exert financial pressure to indicate their dissatisfaction with
the policies of Commission regulatees. These companies enjoy at least partial
monopolies, and an essential product such as electricity or natural gas can-
not be boycotted as easily as grapes or lettuce.,8
In his opinion concurring in the judgment in NAACP v. FPC, Chief
Justice Burger argued that one of the reasons the FPC cannot regulate em-
ployment discrimination through regulation per se is because Congress cen-
tralized such responsibility in the EEOC alone. "9 The legislative histories of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 indicate that Chief Justice Burger was not completely correct, however.
Congress did not mean that the EEOC should be the only Federal agency to
concern itself with job bias.
A memorandum by Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, co-floor
managers in the Senate for the 1964 Civil Rights Act legislation, evidences
congressional intent to preserve other existing and potential mechanisms for
combatting employment discrimination:
Nothing in Title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and
obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act .... Of course,
Title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights
and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State
statutes.
50
Moreover, in 1964 Congress soundly defeated a proposed amendment to Title
VII that would have forbidden "any independent agency of the United States"
other than the EEOC to "pursue any remedy with respect to an employment
practice.., covered by this title."'5' A similar amendment intended to make
Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination was introduced
in the course of congressional consideration of the Equal Employment Oppor-
47 The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission have pondered the adoption of an equal employment opportunity
rule. See 39 Fed. Reg. 2809, 2810 (1974); 37 Fed. Reg. 15518 (1972); 36 Fed. Reg. 10741
(1971). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Communication Commission
already have regulations governing the employment practices of their regulatees. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 528.7 (1974); 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.307, 76.311 (1976).
48 Note, supra note 35, at 102-103.
49 425 U.S. at 674.
50 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
51 Id. at 13650, 13652.
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tunity Act of 1972. Congress also defeated this proposed amendment in the
face of criticism that it would preclude other independent federal agencies,
such as the NLRB and the FCC, as well as the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance, from taking action against employment discrimination."
V. THE FPC's STATUTORY JURISDICTION TO
REGULATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in NAACP v. FPC is, for the most
part, fundamentally sound. A number of the conclusions that the Court drew
from its reasoning are also well-founded.53 Others, however, which will be
discussed here, are neither correct nor justified. Unfortunately, the result of
such a mix is an unnecessarily narrow holding concerning the FPC's
statutory jurisdiction to regulate employment discrimination-a holding
that falls short of the more rational result that the Court's basically well-
considered analysis commands.
A. Regulation and Consumer Protection Against Unjust and Unreasonable
Rates
As previously noted, the Court in NAACP v. FPC endorsed limited
flow-through regulation of the costs of employment discrimination." These
costs of job bias, which the D.C. Circuit in its opinion accurately and ex-
haustively defined, are both numerous and varied.5"
Some are readily apparent. Duplicative labor costs in the form of back-
pay recoveries by employees who have proven through civil litigation that
they were discriminatorily denied employment or promotion,5" the costs of
52 118 CONG. REc. 3960-62, 3965 (1972). See FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9964 (1968); Letter from EEOC
Chairman William H. Brown, III to Congressman Don Edwards, Hearings, supra note 5,
at 121-22.
53 See, e.g., notes 15 and 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
54 See notes 21-26 and accompanying text sapra.
55 See 520 F.2d at 444.
56 The EEOC can file civil actions under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970, Supp. V,
1975). A person discriminated against or a group in that person's behalf may file a private
civil action under Title VII if the EEOC does not act within 180 days after the individual
or group registers a charge. Id. A victim of employment discrimination may also bring a
private suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970), or the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Backpay awards often involve large sums of money. In fiscal year 1975, the EEOC and state
and local fair employment agencies achieved conciliation settlements amounting to nearly
$111 million. LAB. L. REP. (CCH) No. 96 (Nov. 20, 1975). In one not atypical case, United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit awarded black
victims of employment discrimination more than $2,000,000, including $1,750,000 in back
wages, over $90,000 in compensatory per diem payments for travel and living expenses,
and over $200,000 in additional pension benefits. See Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 4
P.U.R. 4th 542 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973); V CiviL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-
1974, supra note 27, at 441 n. 1366, 456; G. GIsSBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT 191, 334, 341 (1974).
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losing government contracts terminated because of employment discrimina-
tion, 5' the costs of attorneys fees and legal proceedings incurred by regula-
tees through the litigation of employment discrimination suits and govern-
ment contract terminations," and the costs of strikes, demonstrations, and
boycotts against regulatees because they practice job bias are obvious
examples of illegitimate expenditures.59
Other costs are more subtle. When a regulatee discriminates, excessive
labor costs result because job applicants who are discriminated against are
eliminated from the job market. Such employer selectivity is grossly inefficient
because it alters the job search behavior of the victims of discrimination by
discouraging them from seeking other employment. This in turn makes it
more difficult and therefore more expensive for employers as a whole to find
qualified personnel."° More importantly, it fosters inefficiency because many
of these victims, who often are more qualified than the employees actually
hired, are never employed.6
Perhaps the most significant yet subtle costs of job bias are demoraliza-
tion costs. When a minority or female employee is discriminated against in
the form of wages, promotion, underemployment, working conditions, and
the like, that employee is seriously affected psychologically. Discouragement
57 Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974). reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), at
10294, requires the termination of a federal contract if the private contractor fails to comply
with the nondiscrimination clauses of the contract.
5 8 See, e.g., 520 F.2d at 444; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Re Florida Power Corp., 5 P.U.R. 4th 544 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 74 P.U.R. (n.s.) 5, 12-13 (Ohio Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1948).
59 See 520 F.2d at 444; American Overseas Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Re Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 100 P.U.R. 3d 1, 11 (Iowa St. Commerce Comm'n
1973); Re Baltimore Transit Co., 94 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129, 131-32 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1952).
60 B. ANDERSON, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC UTILITIES 219 (1970). See also B. SCHILLER,
THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 39-41 (1973).
61 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE 162 (P. Wallace ed. 1976);
J. MCCALL, INCOME MOILrrY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 178 (1973);
L. THUROW, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 121-22, 135 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Additional Views on H.R. 7152 of Congressmen William M. McCullock,
John V. Lindsay, Garner S. Schriver, William T. Cahill, Clark MacGregor, Charles Mathias,
James Bromwell), reprinted in [19641 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2487-2515. See
also Statement of President John F. Kennedy, S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted [1964] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355, 2368.
The exclusion of a substantial portion of the labor force, regardless of qualification, also
will be less efficient in the long run than using all available manpower resources. See G.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION ch. 3 (2d ed. 1971); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 108-10 (1962); P. SAMUELSEN, ECONOMICS-AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
chs. 25, 27 (6th ed. 1964). See also Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,
171 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Mississippi River &
Light Co., 10 FEP Cases 1084 (S.D. Miss. 1975); L. THUROW, supra, at 158; Boyle, Equal
Opportunity for Women is Smart Business, 51 HARV. Bus. REV. 85 (May-June 1973); Busi-
ness in Brief (Feb. 1973), quoted in R. COVINGTON, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS,
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 20 (2d ed. 1973).
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ensues and morale plummets, the ramifications of which can be devasting
in terms of increased costs. Individual on-the-job efficiency diminishes,6"
employee unity and employee relationships deteriorate,63 and absenteeism and
turnover increase,6" all of which reduces productivity.6"
The Court acknowledged these many illegitimate costs of employment
discrimination but expressly refused to hold that all of them are " 'arguably
within' the Commission's 'range of concern.' "66 Instead, the Court endorsed
limited flow-through regulation of only those costs such as backpay awards
and attorneys' fees that "are demonstrably the product of a regulatee's dis-
criminatory employment practices.... ";
To the extent that these and other similar costs.., can be or have been
demonstrably quantified by judicial decree or the final action of an ad-
ministrative agency charged with consideration of such matters, the Com-
mission clearly should treat these costs as it treats any other illegal,
unnecessary, or duplicative costs.67
Thus the Court held that the FPC should concern itself only with those costs
that can be or already have been measured in dollars and cents. This would
appear to exclude demoralization costs and the costs incurred from eliminat-
ing minority and female employees from the job market, both of which are
62 Elmo Roper, nationally known for his analyses of employee attitudes, has stated:
[W]hen the frustration of discrimination is experienced in a man's job, a whole and per-
manent part of his personality is eroded. His will and ambition to be useful, to do
significant work, his need for stability and security, his full growth into a full human
personality are stunted.
E. ROPER, THE HIGH COST OF DISCRIUNATION 9 (1950).
An EEOC study of employment discrimination by American Telephone & Telegraph
found that "Operators, Service Representatives and clerks, whose expectation for promotion
is slim," were "less interested in maintaining a high level of performance .. " The vast
majority of the employees in these job classifications were female. The study concluded that
its findings were consistent with the "Expectancy-Value Theory" that an individual who
greatly desires to achieve a goal but realizes that the chances of such achievement are minimal
will put forth little effort. EEOC, "A Unique Competence": A Study of Equal Employment
Opportunity in the Bell System, in 118 CONG. REC. 4507, 4519 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
A Unique Competence]. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE, supra
note 61, at 140.
63 E. ROPER, supra note 62, at 9, 10-12.
64 A 1969 report by AT&T indicated that in nineteen major metropolitan areas, turnover
among telephone operators with less than six months service, most of whom were women,
had increased from 80 percent in 1964 to 120 percent in 1968. In many areas turnover
among short-term operators had reached 200 percent. A 1970 turnover study by AT&T
indicated that 69 percent of all terminating service representatives, most of whom were also
women, were not satisfied with their chances for promotion. The EEOC in its own study
concluded that much of the blame for such "intolerable turnover" among AT&T's female
employees could be traced to the absence of promotional opportunities. A Unique Com-
petence, supra note 62, at 4508, 4518.
65 See NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1975); E. ROPER, supra note 62, at
7-13; A Unique Competence, supra note 62, at 4518-19.
66 425 U.S. at 668.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
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less subject to quantification than the other costs of job bias. 6
In one respect the Court's holding is confusing. The majority
suggested at one point that its limited flow-through regulation is required;69
later it suggested that its holding is merely that the FPC has the jurisdiction
to regulate in this manner, implying that the Commission may or may not
choose to do so.7" This apparent ambiguity can be reconciled.
Most public utilities, including natural gas and electric power companies,
have a legal duty to charge rates that are just and reasonable. 7 Basically,
this means that a natural gas or electric power company can charge rates
that generate revenue sufficient to meet the company's operating costs and
provide a fair return on investment.7 A utility company may lawfully pass
on to the consumer only those operating costs that are "necessary, usual,
reasonable and recurring."73 The FPC normally enjoys considerable discretion
in ratemaking and the determination of which costs a company may pass on.
Absent arbitrariness, capriciousness, abuse of authority, or lack of supporting
substantial evidence, the courts have been reluctant to second-guess the
Commission. " Justice Harlan, in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,75 one of the
68 Justice Powell was obviously troubled that the NAACP v. FPC majority was not suffici-
ently explicit in limiting its holding to quantifiable costs. In a concurring opinion, he stated:
Although implicit in what the Court says, I think it important to emphasize that the
costs identified in the opinion of the Court of Appeals as categories (4) [the costs of
strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts aimed against discriminatory regulatees], (5) [the
costs incurred from the elimination of minority and female employees from the job
market], and (6) [demoralization costs] could not be quantified ....
In view of the inherently amorphous nature of these categories of costs, it would
not be in the public interest to allow intervenors to delay the orderly progress of rate
proceedings in the vain hope that such costs might, after protracted litigation, be quanti-
fied. I do not read the Court's opinion as requiring any such encumbering of the
Commission's prescribed statutory authority and discretion.
425 U.S. at 672 (Powell, J., concurring).
69 The Commission clearly has the duty to prevent its regulatees from charging rates
based upon illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs. To the extent that such
costs are demonstrably the product of a regulatee's discriminatory employment
practices, the Commission should disallow them.
Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
70 We agree, in short, with the Court of Appeals that the Federal Power Commission is
authorized to consider the consequences of discriminatory employment practices on the
part of its regulatees only insofar as such consequences are directly related to the
Commission's establishment of just and reasonable rates in the public interest.
Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411 (1974). See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
71 Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for Administrative Litigation, 8
72 City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945
(1968); Mello, supra note 71, at 413. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 147 (5th ed. 1969); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS 42 (1970); 1 A PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 191
(1969).
73 Mello, supra note 71, at 412, 413.
74 2 A. PRIEST, supra note 72, at 586. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
790-92 (1968).
75 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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cases that established this role of the courts in reviewing FPC ratemaking
decisions, stated:
[T]he Court must determine whether the order may be reasonably
expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and
fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet
provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both
existing and forseeable. The Court's responsibility is not to supplant
the Commission's balance of these interests with one more nearly to its
liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given rea-
soned consideration to each of the pertinent factors."8
The Court in NAACP v. FPC cited Permian Basin Area Rate Cases
decision 7 and thus must have been aware of its earlier directives concerning
judicial review. NAACP v. FPC should be read, therefore, as holding not only
that the FPC has the jurisdiction for limited flow-through regulation, but that
the Commission must exercise that jurisdiction as well."8 In other words, the
Court apparently gave its own "reasoned consideration" to the "pertinent fac-
tors" of ratemaking delineated in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases and itself de-
termined that the economic costs of employment discrimination are unneces-
sary and illegitimate. In this respect, then, it seems that the FPC no longer
enjoys its traditional ratemaking discretion, and the Commission may never
pass on to the consumer those costs of job bias that are demonstrably
quantifiable. Nevertheless, the opinion is ambiguous.
Nothwithstanding this confusion, the Court's reasoning in NAACP v.
FPC is clear and in large part persuasive. The Court's insistence that any
regulation be reasonably related to the FPC's statutorily defined objectives is
analytically sound. Its holding, however, is narrow beyond justification.
Limited flow-through regulation--defined by the Court as the regulation of
costs that are demonstrably quantifiable-perhaps would result in more just
and reasonable rates if each of the costs of employment discrimination could
be quantified. As the Court itself recognized, such is not the case." Backpay
recoveries, loss of government contracts, and litigation expenses may readily
yield to measurement,8" but other costs-demoralization costs and the
76 Id. at 792.
77 The Court cited Permian Basin Area Rate Cases in its opinion. 425 U.S. at 670 n.5. Both
the NAACP and the FPC cited the case in their briefs to the Court. Brief for Petitioner FPC
at 17, 30; Brief for Petitioners NAACP et al. at 39, n.42, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662
(1976).
78 The FPC recognizes its responsibility to determine which costs it may appropriately pass
on to the consumer, and has promulgated a regulation that requires regulatees to deduct
from income penalties or fines for violations of any regulatory statutes or other laws. See
note 21 supra.
79 See 425 U.S. at 668.
80 See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra. Despite Justice Powell's reservations, note
68 supra, the costs of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts would also appear to be reason-
ably subject to quantification. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
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excessive labor costs incurred when minorities and women are eliminated
through discrimination from the prospective labor force-quite obviously
do not.
8
'
Consider the conclusion of one EEOC study of employment
discrimination:
It is difficult to quantify all of the effects of . . . [employment]
discrimination. Statistical measures omit the real, human tragedies
testified to by Ms. Weeks and Ms. Roig. Sterile, economic measures
cannot be ignored, however, for if they indicate enormous financial
deprivation, surely the intangible consequences of discrimination are
severe.
82
Another authority, testifying before a Senate subcommittee on equal em-
ployment opportunity legislation, framed the problem of quantification this
way:
Here we are speculating about a Negro's lack of motivation. We might
just as well tie a man's legs together and then wonder how fast he can
run.
This is a very complex problem. The lack of motivation is caused by
lack of success. Life for most Negroes is just a vicious circle that keeps
grinding down and down and deeper and deeper. The question you ask,
Senator [How do we provide the motivation?], will never be answered
until the Negro is given an equal opportunity with the whites and until
he has some time to make up for gross injustices done in the past.8"
81 The quantification problem notwithstanding, several economists have advanced economic
theories of discrimination that successfully demonstrate the effect of job bias on consumer
prices. The pioneer in this development was Gary Becker. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Although important contributions to the study of the eco-
nomics of discrimination, Becker's theory, and the theories of his disciples, are not relevant
here. These theories are grounded in the study of discrimination and its effect on wage dif-
ferentials and do not expressly account for or even mention the costs of job bias discussed
in this article. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE, supra note 61,
at 11-22; B. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION (1973). See also R.
TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 40-41 (1974); Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees eds. 1973).
It should also be noted that in 1950, one authority, Elmo Roper, asserted that each
year the total cost of discrimination to American business and industry is at least $10 out
of every $75 paycheck, or $30 billion annually. Unfortunately, Roper did not explain in any
detail how he reached these figures or what specific costs of discrimination they reflect.
E. ROPER, supra note 62, at 5, 13.
82A Unique Competence, supra note 62, at 4522 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
See also G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION chs. 10-11 (2d ed. 1971); B.
SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 133 (2d ed. 1976); Hearings,
supra note 5, at 150.
83 Hearings on S. 773 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1963) (Statement of
Herman P. Miller, Special Ass't, Office of the Director, Bureau of the Census). 17
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The difficulties inherent in measuring these costs of employment dis-
crimination do not make them any less real or substantial, however. This is
especially true with respect to demoralization costs. The D.C. Circuit has
observed that
Senate and House hearings on equal employment bills are laced with
references to the degradation, disillusionment, lack of motivation, and
lessening of incentive to improve which result from racial discrimina-
tion in employment s.8
Congressman Jacob H. Gilbert of New York made one such reference in
his testimony on equal employment opportunity legislation before a House
subcommittee:
The malicious, destructive, discriminatory practices which now abound
in all fields of employment throughout our country, affecting millions of
our people, must be brought to an abrupt halt. We must not continue
to ignore the terrible degradation suffered by those who are victims of
discrimination in employment . . . , for this anguish is visited upon
their children and continues on and on. All hope is killed in the very
young; they know that although they have a high degree of intelligence,
are ambitious and industrious, ... they will be denied advancements
to which they are entitled in any job they hold, because they are of
a minority group.85
The EEOC has also documented the existence of widespread demoralization
costs. One of its studies reports that in a 1970 turnover study conducted by
an employment discriminator, typical employee comments were:
"There is no real chance for advancement in the Company;" "I would
not have terminated my employment with the Company if I felt
I would have advanced within a year;" "I was impressed with the
fact that women are discriminated against.""0
While the Court in NAACP v. FPC did not dwell upon the magnitude
of demoralization costs or the costs incurred when minorities and women
are eliminated through job bias from the labor market, it did recognize
84 United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1137 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969) (footnote omitted).
s85 Hearings on H.R. 405 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1963). See Miller v. International Paper Co.,408 F.2d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1969); H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963);H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 2391, 2514-15; Hearings on H.R. 405 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, supra, at 364. See also K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO;
DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER (1965); PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING ch. VI (H. Witmer &R. Kotinsky eds. 1952); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CYCLE TO NOWHERE 29-33 (1968).
86 A Unique Competence, supra note 62, at 4507, 4518. See note 64 supra. The study re-
vealed that 69 percent of all terminating employees in a particular job classification (most
of whom were women) were not satisfied with their opportunity for promotion. Id. at 4518.
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the difficulty of quantifying these costs. Yet the Court endorsed Commission
regulation anyway, and sought to circumvent the quantification dilemma
by limiting such regulation to costs that can be demonstrably measured.
In this way the Court apparently hoped to strike a balance between what it
perceived to be reasonable regulation and the congressional requirement of
just and reasonable rates. However, the FPC enabling acts require just and
reasonable rates in unequivocal and categorical terms.8" By its choice of
language Congress prohibited all costs determined by the courts or the
FPC to be illegitimate, not just such of those illegitimate costs as can be
conveniently quantified. 88 This congressional mandate cannot and should not
be compromised. The NAACP v. FPC definition of limited flow-through
regulation, however, does precisely that. By determining that those costs
of job bias that "are demonstrably the product of a regulatee's discrimina-
tory employment practices" are "illegal, duplicative, [and] unnecessary,"
but then in a second breath prohibiting only such of those costs that can
be or have been "demonstrably quantified,"89 the Court violated the very
statutory mandate that it so painstakingly sought to follow throughout its
opinion.9" Demoralization costs and the costs of eliminating those discrimi-
nated against from the job market are "demonstrably the product" of job
bias, even if they do defy ready quantification. And particularly in the case
of demoralization costs, this "product" is quite a large one indeed. For
this reason the Court's limited flow-through regulation is unacceptable.
The Court's holding in NAACP v. FPC might be more palatable
if the only means of curtailing these unquantifiable costs were their quan-
tification followed by their elimination through limited flow-through regu-
lation. But another unexplored avenue exists. The FPC can prevent
these costs, as well as those costs that can be measured, from being borne
by the consumer by preventing them from ever arising. This requires the
eradication of the costs' root cause-employment discrimination itself-
87 See note 16 and accompanying text supra. The Federal Water Power Act states:
[T]he rates charged and the service rendered... [by regulated electric power companies]
. * .shall be reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and just to the customer and all unreason-
able, discriminatory and unjust rates or services are prohibited and declared to be unlaw-
ful ... 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
The Federal Power Act states:
All rates and charges ... shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that
is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.
Id. at § 824d(a). The Natural Gas Act contains language similar to the Federal Power Act.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1970), with 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. §
717d(a).
88 See note 22 supra.
89 425 U.S. at 668.
9 0 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 15 & 17-20 and accompanying
text supra.
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which can only be accomplished through what this article will term "preven-
tive flow-through regulation."91
Preventive flow-through regulation would be much like the antidis-
crimination measures currently used by the FCC, with several improve-
ments." The FPC would prescribe in detail the minimum requirements
to which its regulatees must adhere in their personnel practices. The
Commission then would receive or, after Commission investigation, would
itself raise complaints, adjudicate them, and punish infractions.93 The Com-
mission could adjudicate these complaints through an independent admin-
istrative hearing or through a subhearing when a regulatee applies for a
license or license renewal, a certificate or certificate renewal, a rate renewal
91 At this juncture, several points deserve emphasis. First, it is important to realize that on the
basis of a purely economic analysis, if all of the costs of job bias could be accurately quanti-
fied, and these costs proved to be less than the cost of FPC regulation, either preventive or
limited, the Commission would better serve the consumer by allowing the costs of job bias
to continue to be passed along. If this were in fact the case, perhaps FPC regulation not only
would not be required, but it also would be prohibited.
Second, one may legitimately ask'whether preventive flow-through regulation is or should
be required for all types of unnecessary yet unquantifiable costs. For example, if the natural
gas and electric power industries were characterized by widespread theft of company stamps
by assistant vice-presidents, and although it was clear that such thefts were occur-
ring, the costs involved could not be accurately measured, would or should some type of
preventive flow-through regulation of stamp theft be required? In other words, why should
preventive regulation be required for the costs of employment discrimination and not for
other illegitimate costs? The answer lies in the importance of equal employment opportunity as
a social policy. Both the prohibition of employment discrimination and the prohibition of stamp
theft make good sense economically, but the prohibition of employment discrimination,
unlike the prohibition of stamp theft, is also a social goal of the highest priority. See note 9
and accompanying text supra. Congressman William McCulloch made the point well when
he stated:
Aside from the political and economic considerations, however, we believe in the
creation of job equality because it is the right thing to do. We believe in the inherent
dignity of man. He is born with certain inalienable rights. His uniqueness is such that
we refuse to treat him as if his rights and well-being are bargainable. All vestiges of in-
equality based solely on race must be removed in order to preserve our democratic
society, to maintain our country's leadership, and to enhance mankind.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 30 (1963) (Additional Views on H.R. 7152
of Congressmen William M. McCulloch, John V. Lindsay, Garner S. Schriver, William T.
Cahill, Clark MacGregor, Charles Mathias, James Bromwell).
Finally, this article discusses preventive flow-through regulation in the context of ajudicial road not taken, Congress should also rethink the FPC's enabling acts and consider
passing legislation that expressly provides for preventive regulation of job bias.
President Carter's energy reorganization bill, which would abolish the FPC and transfer its
functions and programs into a new Department of Energy, should provide Congress with such
an opportunity. See Carter Sends Energy Unit Plan to Hill, The Washington Post, March
2, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
92 See 47 C.F.R. §§21.307, 76.311 (1976).
13 Before it would act, the Commission would refer any complaints of noncompliance
involving an alleged violation of Title VII to the EEOC. If the EEOC did not act or did not
satisfactorily resolve the complaint, then the FPC could invoke its jurisdiction. In some
instances, because of the FPC's expertise or likely effectiveness, see notes 37-44 and ac-
companying text supra, or because of problems that the EEOC is facing, see notes 27-33
and accompanying text supra, the EEOC may wish to request that the FPC proceed in
lieu of EEOC action. See also notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
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or increase, or any other FPC-controlled benefit.9" Punishment for infractions
of prescribed personnel practices could take the form of an FPC corrective
order to the regulatee to comply within a reasonable period of time in
order to receive or keep its license or certificate.9" An alternative sanction
would be the denial of the regulatee's application for a rate renewal or the
adjustment of its rate levels according to the gravity and extent of the
discrimination involved. 9 The Commission also could vary the regulatee's
rate of return on investment."
Preventive flow-through regulation also would require the regulatee to
file with the FPC a copy of its EEO-1 form, a report that many regulatees must
file annually with the EEOC. This would assist the Commission in supervision
of regulatees' affirmative action programs, another suggested requirement
of preventive flow-through regulation. Affirmative action would be necessary
for effective FPC preventive regulation. Consider the observations of one
authority:
Of all the types of discrimination which the Civil Rights Act prohibits,
the most difficult to detect and to enforce is discrimination in employ-
ment. This is "an area in which subtleties of conduct play no small
part." It is relatively easy for an employer.., to set up artificial bar-
riers where it is exceedingly difficult for the law to penetrate. 9
94 In adjudicating complaints the FPC should consider several approaches that may facilitate
more effective and efficient adjudication. The Commission should consider treating EEOC
and judicial decisions in employment discrimination cases as binding in its own proceedings.
See Daly, supra note 36, at 682-87. The FPC should consider allowing the use of statistical
evidence to prove and disprove employment discrimination. Id. at 669-73. See Bilingual
Bicultural Coalition of Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 492 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stone v.
FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 325-326 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Commission also should consider
allowing the use of the "prima facie case" in its proceedings. Federal court Title
VII litigation involves this approach. Once a complainant proves that he or she
is qualified and that statistically his or her minority group or sex is significantly under-
represented in the employer's work force, a prima facie case of discrimination is made. The
burden of production then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that no discrimination
occurred. This approach is especially important where a complainant encounters difficulty
in proof because of problems in obtaining evidence of the employer's hiring practices. See
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). See also Fiss, A Theory of
Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 270-73 (1971).
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e), 717o (1970); 16 U.S.C. H9 797(e), 797(f), 798, 799, 800,
820, (1970); note 40 supra and accompanying text. The FPC should use revocation spar-
ingly, only as the ultimate penalty in cases of severe or repeated noncompliance when no
other sanction would be appropriate or has been effective. Despite its draconian effect, how-
ever, the Commission should resort to revocation when necessary.
9 6 See 15 U.S.C. § 717(d), 717o (1970); 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1970); note 40 and accompanying
text supra.
97 Id. Basically, rate of return on investment is that portion of a regulatee's rate set by
a regulatory agency to allow the regulatee "to support its credit and to raise required supplies
of new equity capital on terms fair to the old investors. .. " J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 72 at
257-58. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
98 Affeldt, Title ViH in the Federal Courts - Private or Public Law, 14 VILL. L. REv. 664,
672 (1969) (footnote omitted).
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Affirmative action is needed to penetrate such artificial barriers. Clifford
Alexander, a former chairman of the EEOC, has noted that "it has been
the experience of the EEOC that a periodic showing of affirmative action
is usually necessary to effectively eliminate discrimination .... ,,99
The details of affirmative action plans should be left to the FPC's
informed discretion, but as a minimum such plans should require regulatees
to implement continuing employment practices designed to assure equal job op-
portunity. Recruiting qualified personnel through schools and colleges with
substantial minority group enrollments, encouraging present employees to
refer qualified minority and female applicants for employment consideration,
and avoiding the use of culturally biased employment tests and other inher-
ently discriminatory hiring techniques are representative. 0 ' Any type of
quota system in employment or promotion would, of course, be undesirable
as well as illegal. 10
Preventive flow-through regulation may be more necessary today than
ever before. The United States is currently facing a serious energy shortage.
The FPC has recognized that the financial health of utility companies is "the
greatest electric power problem confronting the industry and the nation.' 0 2
Considering the costs associated with the extensive employment discrimination
by natural gas and electric power companies, the financial health of these
companies would likely be improved by preventive flow-through regulation.
The curtailment of these unnecessary costs by the curtailment of job bias
itself would mean not only that consumers would not have to shoulder
higher than necessary rates, but it would also mean that such costs would
not have to be absorbed by the companies either. Profits would likely
increase, dividends would grow larger, and bond ratings would improve,
attracting new investment capital for expansion, exploration, and the de-
velopment of energy reserves. Of course, the cost of preventive flow-through
regulation may itself appear large in the short run. But over time, as the
Commission and its regulatees together reduced employment discrimination
and its associated costs, the long run financial benefits to natural gas and
electric power companies would likely be worth it.
As a final point, it is important to note that'in spite of its pervasiveness,
99 BROADCASTING, Nov. 18, 1968, at 46. See, e.g., AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE ANSWER To DIscRiMINATION? (1976);
G. GINSBURG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT (1973); PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WORKSHOP (1973); Donegan, The Philadelphia Plan: A
Viable Means of Achieving Equal Opportunity in the Construction Industry or More Pie
in the Sky? 20 KAN. L. REV. 195 (1972); Pati & Fahey, Affirmative Action Program: Its
Realities and Challenges, 24 LAB. L.J. 351 (1973).
10 0 See 47 C.F.R. §21.307(b), 21.307(c), 76.311(b), 76.311(c) (1976).
101 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1970).
102 54 FPC ANN. REP. 9 (1974).
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preventive flow-through regulation is not analytically inconsistent with
NAACP v. FPC. The Court required limited flow-through regulation only
because the task of ensuring that the illegitimate costs of job bias are not
passed along to the consumer is synonymous with the FPC's statutory man-
date to protect that consumer against unjust and unreasonable rates. In this
respect preventive flow-through regulation is no different from limited flow-
through regulation. Authority for preventive regulation, like authority for
limited regulation, can be traced directly to the Commission's enabling
acts. Preventive regulation, like limited regulation, is designed to eliminate
the unlawful effect of the costs of job bias on regulatees' rates. As Judge
McGowan noted in the D.C. Circuit opinion in NAACP v. FPC, the truly
pivotal distinction to be made is "between regulation reasonably related
to the Commission's central functions, and regulation of employment dis-
crimination for its own sake."' 3 Preventive flow-through regulation, it is
contended, is of the former variety.
B. Regulation and Consumer Protection Against Service Discrimination
Through Sections 205(b) and 206(a) of the Federal Power Acte "
and Sections 5(a) and 4(b) of the Natural Gas Act,' Congress expressly
charged the FPC to prohibit discrimination by regulatees in the provision
of their services. The Court in NAACP v. FPC did not mention this re-
quirement, but the D.C. Circuit in its opinion did. The circuit court sug-
gested that, unlike the case with FCC regulatees, "the likelihood that...
discrimination in employment might work its way into the provision of [FPC
regulatees'] services seems to us a slight one."0 For this reason, the D.C.
Circuit found that Congress' prohibition against service discrimination does
not require FPC regulation of job bias.
Many of the decisions by natural gas and electric power companies,
while of little consequence to other consumers, may particularly affect mem-
bers of minority groups. This results in part from the nation's extensive
residential segregation.' When a natural gas or electric power company
103 520 F.2d at 444.
104 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(b), 824e(a) (1970). This statutory instruction to prohibit service
discrimination by regulatees has prompted the Commission to proscribe discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religious creed, and national origin in the use of recreational facilities
at licensed hydroelectric projects. See 18 C.F.R. §8.3 (1967). The Commission has enforced
this regulation through field inspections and by entertaining complaints in connection with
license renewal proceedings. Hearings, supra note 5, at 60-61, 73-74. The regulation of dis-
crimination, then, is not new to the FPC.
105 15 U.S.C. §§717c(b), 717d(a) (1970).
106 520 F.2d at 443.
107 See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning
After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
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decides to construct, 08, improve, 1"9 extend,"' or abandon"' a facility, such
decisions could significantly affect the quality or even the continued exist-
ence of services to minorities."' Rate structure decisions could also favor
or disadvantage those residing in neighborhoods of predominantly minority
group composition,"' as could decisions by natural gas and electric power
companies concerning the resolution of environmental problems."'
If there is to be proper sensitivity to the effects of these decisions on
minority populations, and if, as the statutes clearly require, there is to be
adequate assurance the minorities will not be discriminated against as a
result of these decisions, members of minority groups must be parties to
the decision-making process. Natural gas and electric power companies can
fully and effectively ensure such input only by hiring qualified minorities
and placing them in positions of corporate responsibility. This requires equal
employment opportunity, which, considering the magnitude of job bias
in these industries, necessitates FPC preventive flow-through regulation."'
While the primary purpose of such regulation is, of course, the eradication
108 15 U.S.C. §717f (1970); 16 U.S.C. §797(e) (1970).
109 16 U.S.C. §797(e) (1970).
110 15 U.S.C. §717f (1970).
"1 15 U.S.C. §717f (1970); 16 U.S.C. §799 (1970).
112 See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (Mississippi town held
to be discriminating against black residents by not providing certain municipal services);
Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v.
Illinois, 20 HASTINGs L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1969); Comment, Equal Protection in the Urban
Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TuL. L. REV. 496 (1972). Abascal
writes of a group of impoverished Mexican-American farmworkers from Wasco, California,
who filed a complaint with the California Public Utilities Commission. The group alleged
that a private water company served their Mexican-American residential area of Wasco,
while a municipal water company served the rest of Wasco. According to the complaint, the
water received by the Mexican-Americans was oily, turgid, bacteria-ridden, and unpalatable,
while the rate they were charged was higher than the rate charged by the municipal system.
"s For a discussion of the impact of rate structure decisions on minority neighborhoods, see
Memorandum of David J. Bardin, former Deputy General counsel of the FPC, in Hearings,
supra note 5, at 89-91, 97-98.
114 In FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 5,30 (1961), respondents alleged
that by permitting the Consolidated Edison Company in New York City to use natural gas
would significantly reduce air pollution. As American cities become increasingly populated
by blacks and other minority groups who cannot afford the "flight to the suburbs," environ-
mental decisions by natural gas and electric power companies could significantly affect racial
and ethnic minorities concentrated in urban areas. See generally Note, Application of the
Preemption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REV. 738,
756 (1976).
115 See Brief for Petitioners at 36-38, NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd,
425 U.S. 662 (1976). The FCC has concluded that "a company which follows discriminatory
employment practices would find it difficult to provide nondiscriminatory services." FCC Pro-
posed Rulemaking: Communications Common Carriers-Non-Discrimination in Employment
Practices, 34 Fed. Reg. 19200, 19201 (1969).
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of the costs of job bias, it necessarily involves the elimination of job bias
itself."'
One commentator argues from a somewhat different perspective that
the nondiscrimination in services requirement implicitly mandates Com-
mission regulation of job bias." 7 He asserts 'that natural gas and electric
power companies occupy privileged positions. As regulatees, they are
granted at least partial monopolies as well as the use of limited public
resources in order to provide their services to the public. These industries bene-
fit handsomely in the sale of their services from such protection against free
market competition and the use of limited public resources. In return, the
public is entitled to expect adequate services and the opportunity for
employment that arises out of the provision of these services. Moreover,
both benefits, it is argued, should be equally accessible to all. To ensure
such accessibility, however, necessitates extensive FPC regulation of em-
ployment discrimination, which preventive flow-through regulation would
provide.
CONCLUSION
In NAACP v. FPC the Court held that the FPC must initiate limited
flow-through regulation of the costs of employment discrimination. The
Court charged the Commission to prevent only the quantifiable costs of
job bias from being passed along to the consumer of natural gas and
electric power. The Court's analysis is basically sound, as evidenced by
the Commission's enabling acts, their legislative histories, and judicial
construction of these statutes. The Federal Water Power Act, the Federal
Power Act, and the Natural Gas Act direct the FPC to ensure just and
reasonable rates by its regulatees. The courts have construed two of these
acts-the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act-as being primarily
concerned with the protection of the natural gas and electric power con-
sumer against economic exploitation. Hence, FPC regulation of employment
discrimination is proper.
116 The D.C. Circuit in NAACP v. FPC implied that if service discrimination by FPC
regulatees were ever found to be "so subtle and unsusceptible of direct remedy as to require
the eradication of its root cause," extensive FPC regulation of employment discrimination
would be proper. 520 F.2d at 443. See Pennsylvania Water and Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d
230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952), which also suggests that preventive
flow-through regulation would be appropriate:
In place of competition as a generalized and indirect regulator of prices and services in
the field of interstate transmission of electric energy at wholesale, Congress has substituted
a regulatory agency authorized to supervise almost every phrase of the regulated com-
pany's business. Rates charged by such utilities, as well as the services and contractual
provisions affecting them, must be "just and reasonable." And what is "just and reason-
able" is ... determined ... by the adequacy of the service to the public .... [footnote
omitted].
I17 Note, supra note 35, at 102. See generally The Public Interest and National Policy, supra
note 40, at 435 n.74.
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The Court's analysis may be sound, but its result is less than satisfactory.
Many of the costs of employment discrimination, although real and sub-
stantial, are difficult, if not impossible, to measure in dollars and cents.
The answer, however, is not limited flow-through regulation. Congress in
the FPC's enabling acts expressly and unequivocally required just and
reasonable rates, thus prohibiting all costs determined to be illegitimate,
unnecessary, and duplicative, not just such of those costs that are demon-
strably quantifiable. The only effective approach, therefore, and the approach
the Court should have sanctioned, is the eradication of all illegitimate
costs of job bias before they arise. This requires the elimination of em-
ployment discrimination itself through preventive flow-through regulation.
Although much more extensive than limited flow-through regulation,
preventive regulation is still consistent with the NAACP v. FPC analysis.
The primary purpose of preventive regulation is the regulation of the
costs of job bias; its jurisdiction, therefore, is firmly established in the
Commission's enabling acts. Moreover, regulation as extensive as preventive
flow-through regulation is necessary to prevent service discrimination by
regulatees, a practice that the FPC enabling acts also expressly forbid.
NAACP v. FPC and the questions that it poses should also be viewed
in light of other legitimate considerations. Employment discrimination in
the natural gas and electric power industries is alarmingly pervasive. The
EEOC, plagued by a myriad of internal problems and floundering badly,
has been ineffective in combatting this discrimination. Private enforcement
of equal employment opportunity, though helpful, is alone not an adequate
solution either. Proper FPC regulation of employment discrimination could
be a worthwhile addition to the EEOC and private enforcement efforts,
because of the FPC's special relationship with its regulatees and the powerful
regulatory sanctions at the Commission's disposal. Unfortunately, limited
flow-through regulation does not take advantage of this unique potential.
Preventive flow-through regulation would.
These criticisms notwithstanding, some may legitimately view NAACP
v. FPC as a modest first step. Limited regulation is, after all, better than no
regulation. But if it is a beginning, it is an unnecessarily small one. "Equal
employment opportunity is the law of the land" has long been an empty and
unfulfilled promise, especially in the natural gas and electric power industries.
NAACP v. FPC is not likely to change that significantly.
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